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CARL SCHMITT AND THE CRITIQUE OF LAWFARE
David Luban
“Lawfare” is the use of law as a weapon of war against a military
adversary. Lawfare critics complain that self-proclaimed “humanitarians”
are really engaged in the partisan and political abuse of law—lawfare. This
paper turns the mirror on lawfare critics themselves, and argues that the
critique of lawfare is no less abusive and political than the alleged lawfare
it attacks. Radical lawfare critics view humanitarian law with suspicion, as
nothing more than an instrument used by weak adversaries against strong
military powers. By casting suspicion on humanitarian law, they undermine
disinterested argument, and ultimately undermine the validity of their own
critique. The paper then explores the vision of politics and law underlying
the lawfare critique through a reading of the most significant theorist who
defends that vision, the German theorist Carl Schmitt. Through a reading
and critique of Schmitt, the article examines both the force of the lawfare
critique and its flaws.
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I. INTRODUCTION
―Lawfare‖ is the use of law as a weapon of war against a military
adversary. Law can be weaponized in many ways, but easiest is accusing
the adversary of war crimes, thereby subjecting him to harassment through
litigation and bad publicity. War crimes accusations are not the only method
of lawfare, of course. The U.S. government lawyers who wrote the torture
memos, contriving legal arguments to legitimize Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) torture, were engaged in lawfare of a different sort; indeed, John
Yoo, the best-known of these lawyers, indirectly boasted about lawfare by
titling his memoir War By Other Means,1 an ingenious twist on the Clause
University Professor and Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University
Law Center.
1
JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER‘S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR
(2006).
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witizian dictum that war is politics by other means. In his view, apparently,
the law he practiced in his government service was war by other means,
which is simply another name for lawfare. In other contexts as well, states
can wage lawfare just as non-state actors can. Major General Charles J.
Dunlap, Jr., who popularized the term ―lawfare,‖ points out that lawfare
―can operate as a positive ‗good,‘‖ and details several examples in which
the United States has substitut[ed] lawfare methodologies for traditional
material means.2 My chief example of lawfare, though, will be accusations
by non-state actors of war crimes by a powerful, modern army. That is surely what today‘s shouting is about.
Although the term ―lawfare‖ can be used purely descriptively, as
General Dunlap does, it usually is not.3 ―Lawfare‖ is a pejorative and polemical word. To accuse someone of lawfare is to accuse them of something
sneaky. There are two pieces to the accusation. First is the insinuation that
those who wage lawfare are fighting by cowardly means. That was the implication of a much-remarked sentence from the National Defense Strategy
of the United States in 2002 and 2005: ―Our strength as a nation state will
continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using
international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism.‖4 Lumping judicial
processes together with terrorism as part of a ―strategy‖ is equivalent to
accusing those who take the United States government to court with lawfare
of a particularly vile sort, and labeling lawfare ―a strategy of the weak‖ is a
taunt. Why doesn‘t the enemy just come out and fight like real men, instead
of pretending to be disinterested adherents to legality?
Second, the lawfare accusation implicitly assumes that ―lawriors‖—
as I shall call those who engage in lawfare—are abusing the law by making
unfounded accusations of illegality against their enemies. The lawrior poses
as a disinterested legal actor who, more in sorrow than in anger, calls the
world‘s attention to war crimes by a party who, just by coincidence, hap-

2

Charles J. Dunlap, Commentary, Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT‘L AFF.
146, 146–47 (2008).
3
Id. at 146, attempts to define the term neutrally, as ―the strategy of using—or misusing—law,‖ which treats law as ―a means that can be used for good or bad purposes.‖ This
contrasts with Dunlap‘s earlier paper on lawfare, which agrees with some of the harshest
lawfare critics that ―too often NGO positions look like political agendas,‖ and that ―there is
an undeniable element of anti-Americanism in international law as it is developing today.‖
Charles J. Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st
[Century] Conflicts, 2001, available at http://www.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2010).
4
National Defense Strategy of the United States (Mar. 2005) available at http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/nds-usa_mar2005.htm (last visited Dec. 7,
2010). See also Dunlap, supra note 2, at 148 (Notably, Gen. Dunlap explicitly reacted
against this sentiment: ―To be clear, I condemn any interpretation of lawfare which would
cast as terrorists those legitimately using the courts to challenge any governmental action.‖).
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pens to be the adversary. Such accusations are factually or legally baseless.
So lawfare is a double affront, against both martial virtue and legal virtue.
Let me say a bit more about why lawfare offends against legal virtue. Lawfare is a species of the politicization of law. Legitimate legal claims
appeal to standards that transcend the particular case and the particular parties. Legal claims are never supposed to be demands backed by nothing but
the will of the parties—‖give it to me because I want it!‖—but rather demands backed by claims under neutral standards, taking the form ―give it to
me because I have a legal right to it!‖ Of course we are entitled to skepticism about the political neutrality of the law at all levels: legislation, access
to legal institutions, judicial interpretation, and application of law to facts.
But law can and does hold out the promise of at least relative neutrality and
relative depoliticization—compared with partisan mud-slinging, dirty tricks,
and armed conflict; and it is hard to see how law could fool so many people
so much of the time if it never delivered on the promise.
The lawfare critic accuses the enemy lawrior of politicizing law,
presumably for base reasons. Specifically, the lawfare critic accuses the
enemy lawrior of abusing international humanitarian law and international
criminal law to hamstring or at least harass enemy military planners.5 The
past decade has seen two major eruptions of the lawfare critique. 6 The first
was by the United States during the Bush Administration, and the second
was by Israel and American supporters of Israel in the wake of the Goldstone Report. In the first case, the accusations were that the governments of
―old Europe‖ and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) aimed to undermine U.S. tactics
in the War on Terror for essentially political motives.7 Here, the accusation
of lawfare was indirect: no one accused the ICRC or western Europeans of
intentionally aiding al-Qaeda, although some lawfare critics insinuated that
the Europeans might have a geopolitical agenda of hobbling U.S. military

5

I use the term ―international humanitarian law‖ (IHL) rather than the standard military
phrase ―law of armed conflict‖ (LOAC) for two reasons. First, I use it to emphasize that I am
talking about international rather than domestic law, and second, to emphasize that a great
deal of IHL grows out of the humanitarian agenda of limiting the suffering and destructiveness of warfare to the extent possible.
6
By the term ―lawfare critique‖ I mean the attack on international humanitarian law and
its institutions as a form of lawfare; and I use the phrase ―lawfare critic‖ to denote someone
engaged in the lawfare critique.
7
For notable accusations of lawfare made against the ICRC, see David B. Rivkin Jr. &
Lee A. Casey, Rule of Law: Friend or Foe?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2005, at A23 (criticizing
the ICRC study of customary international humanitarian law as politicized and calling for the
United States to defund the ICRC); David B. Rivkin Jr., et al., Not Your Father’s Red Cross,
NAT‘L REV. ONLINE, Dec. 20, 2004, http://crunchycon.nationalreview.com/articles/213182/
not-your-fathers-red-cross/david-b-rivkin-jr (last visited Dec. 7, 2010) (accusing the ICRC of
abandoning its impartial role in favor of advocacy).
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dominance.8 Rather, the accusation was that the humanitarian groups are the
jihadis‘ useful idiots. The reaction to the Goldstone Report was different:
here, the accusation was, in the words of journalist Jeffrey Goldberg, that
Richard Goldstone was ―the chief of the hanging party‖ whose ―mandate . .
. was to find Israel guilty.‖9 This is a more direct accusation of intentional
and deliberate lawfare than in the American debate.
Just as the accusation of lawfare is a species of the broader accusation of politicizing law—specifically, that lawriors politicize law for someone‘s military advantage—it is also a species of ad hominem argument. By
unmasking the recourse to humanitarian law as lawfare on behalf of an interested party‘s military goals, lawfare critics deflects attention from the
substance of the legal claims to the self-interest and sneaky motives of the
person entering them. Like all ad hominem arguments, the lawfare critique
has the rhetorical function of diverting attention from what classical rhetoric
called the logos of an argument—its substance—to its ethos—the character
of the speaker.10 The logos in this case is the argument that soldiers have
committed war crimes; the ethos is the insidious and militarized motives of
making those accusations.
Of course, ad hominem criticism is itself the primary technique of
politicized argument. Lawfare critics are themselves engaged in lawfare.
Not that critiques of lawfare are necessarily a form of lawfare, just as not all
war crimes accusations are a form of lawfare. Sometimes an argument is
just an argument. But the most conspicuous lawfare critics are suspicious of
the claims of self-proclaimed humanitarian and human rights lawyers to be
disinterested. Engaged in mortal combat against the lawriors, lawfare critics
have no more use for disinterested inquiry than does a soldier on a battlefield.11
Some issues seem to lend themselves to politicized academic treatment because they tap into high-stakes public controversies, however indirectly. Some years ago, I was working on a law-and-literature paper about
the trial scene in Aeschylus‘s Oresteia, and my research led to questions

8
Perhaps the paradigm text about the European agenda and its differences from that of
the United States is ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE
NEW WORLD ORDER (Vintage Books, 2004).
9
Jeffrey Goldberg, On That United Nations Report, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 2009, available
at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2009/09/on-that-united-nations-report/
26777.
10
The source of the distinction is Aristotle, Rhetoric, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 2152, 2155 (Jonathan Barnes ed. 1984), 1,2.1356a1-21. (The Barnes edition
mistypes the marginal number as 1358a1.)
11
Here I have specifically in mind the ―Lawfare Project,‖ an organization that in 2010
staged one-sided ―academic‖ conferences at major law schools to denounce the Goldstone
Report and the threat lawfare supposedly poses to American interests.
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about whether there has ever been a historical matriarchy.12 One famous
1861 interpretation of the Oresteia maintains that its legend derives from an
actual conquest of a matriarchal Greek society by patriarchal Dorian invaders.13 Frederick Engels accepted this interpretation in The Origins of the
Family, Private Property, and the State, and as a result it became official
dogma in the Communist world.14 I discovered that it was virtually impossible to find classicists on either side of the question of historical matriarchy
who were not caught up in Cold War polemics. It was difficult for an outsider to the debate, such as myself, who had no dog in the fight, to find
scholarship that did not smell unreliable.15 Apparently, the Cold War sucked
even an obscure question of anthropology and archaeology into a political
vortex, and pulled the scholars in with it. Another example is the tiresome
and endless debate about punitive damages and alleged American litigiousness and runaway juries. Some years ago I attended an academic conference
on punitive damages with a distinguished speaker-list that was quite balanced between the ―pros,‖ the ―antis,‖ and the ―empiricists‖ who actually
had data about the incidence of punitive damages. The morning the conference began, its dismayed organizer announced that the pro-business, antipunitive damages speakers had pulled out. It seems that the general counsel
of a major insurance company had read the papers in draft and concluded
that the empirical studies were too damning to the anti-punitive damages
side. Therefore the conference must be delegitimized by appearing to be
one-sided business bashing. She organized corporate clients to instruct their
counsel on the speaker‘s program to pull out of the conference. The conference organizer was flabbergasted. As I recall, only one pro-business speaker remained. Today‘s lawfare debate has many of the earmarks of these other debates: the scholarship always contains veiled polemical subtext that
outsiders to the debate can sense even if they cannot decode it.16 Ultimately,
12

AESCHYLUS, THE ORESTEIA, (Hugh Lloyd-Jones, trans., 1993).
FREDERICK ENGELS, THE ORIGINS OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE STATE:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESEARCHES OF LEWIS H. MORGAN (Ernest Untermann trans., 1902).
JOHAN JAKOB BACHOFEN, DAS MUTTERRECHT (1861) (Mutterrecht translates to ―Mother
Right.‖).
14
ENGELS, supra note 13.
15
I finally found one scholarly article that actually gave a balanced presentation. Marilyn
Arthur, Review Essay: Classics, 2 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 382
(1976).The classic Marxist interpretation is GEORGE THOMSON, AESCHYLUS AND ATHENS: A
STUDY IN THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DRAMA (Lawrence & Wishart 4th ed. 1973).
16
Of course, readers may wonder the same thing about this paper. To lift the veil on my
own subtext, I devoted several years to criticizing the Bush administration for engaging in
and legitimizing torture, and lawfare critics may regard such criticism as an instance of lawfare. See, e.g., David Luban, The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL
ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007). I also criticized Bush Administration legal positions on detentions in Guantánamo, in The War on Terrorism and the End of
Human Rights, in WAR AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 51 (Verna V. Gehring ed., 2002). See also
13
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readers who honestly want to form an opinion and who come to the scholarship for insight rather than validation of prior political positions will be disappointed. They will conclude, as I did reading the ―historical matriarchy‖
literature, that hardly any of it is trustworthy. Not only are the legal issues
politicized, but the academic debates about them are as well.
The lawfare critique is not simply that those accusing states of war
crimes have ulterior motives, which would not be an interesting charge. Of
course they have ulterior motives. Anyone who voluntarily has recourse to
the institutions of the law has ulterior motives: nobody ever files a lawsuit
out of disinterested curiosity in the answer to a legal question. In everyday
litigation, we hardly think it noteworthy or morally condemnable to learn
that a plaintiff has a self-interested motive for the suit; if she didn‘t, we
might in fact deny her standing. Undoubtedly, the ICRC has its own institutional interest in defending its interpretation of international humanitarian
law. Undoubtedly, Hamas had ulterior motives in steering the Goldstone
Commission to some witnesses rather than others, just as Israel had ulterior
motives in hampering Goldstone‘s investigation. Any competent lawyer has
strategic reasons behind her choice of which legal arguments she will advance, when she will advance them, and in which forum. If strategic, goaloriented planning behind legal arguments is the hallmark of lawfare, all
litigation is like lawfare. The only difference is the specific military nature
of the goal, that is, that legal success will constrain a state‘s military forces
by declaring some of their tactics legally off-limits. The real issue, as in
domestic litigation, is not whether parties have ulterior motives, but whether
the ulterior motives can be backed with valid legal arguments—whether
logos underlies ethos and pathos. To insinuate that advancing such arguments is lawfare, and hence illegitimate, is to insinuate that law should never constrain armed might. Thus the radical critique of lawfare amounts to an
assault on international humanitarian law and international criminal law as
such.
II. CARL SCHMITT AS LAWFARE CRITIC
I am interested in the intellectual genealogy of the lawfare critique.
Is there a coherent philosophy behind the mistrust of humanitarian law as a
tool or pretext for disarming a state‘s military? In my view, such a philosophy exists in one of the most significant and famous works of political
theory of the twentieth century, Carl Schmitt‘s 1932 essay The Concept of
David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantánamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981 (2008)
(criticizing U.S. officials for trying to undermine legal representations of Guantánamo detainees, and arguing that these efforts may have been lawfare responding to perceived lawfare
by the Guantánamo defense bar). Such criticism might also fall under hostile scrutiny from
lawfare critics. I respond that sometimes an argument is just an argument.
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the Political.17 Schmitt was a conservative jurist and philosopher during the
Weimar Republic. He fell into eclipse after World War II because he had
been a legal publicist for the Nazi Party, and had published some antiSemitic writings.18 In the 1970s, Schmitt went through a curious revival by
theorists on the left, and, after 9/11, interest in him ratcheted up again,
largely because of his writings that support untrammeled executive power in
the face of emergency.19 Many writers noticed the ―Schmittian‖ character of
the Bush Administration‘s constitutional arguments, and political theorist
and commentator Alan Wolfe included in his 2009 book The Future of Liberalism a chapter bearing the wonderful title ―Mr. Schmitt Goes to Washington.‖20 Schmitt lived well into his 90s and was able to witness his own
rehabilitation and indeed his ultimate recognition as a major political thinker. And, like it or not, Schmitt is a major political thinker, as well as a powerfully seductive and stimulating writer.
The fundamental proposition of The Concept of the Political is that
properly understood, ―the political‖ refers solely to the friend-enemy dis17
CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (expanded ed. trans. George Schwab,
2007). This expanded edition also contains Leo Strauss‘s Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (trans. J. Harvey Lomax), and Schmitt‘s 1929 paper The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations (trans. Matthias Konzett & John P. McCormick). The latter
paper is essentially a continuation of The Concept of the Political, and Strauss‘s important
comments on Schmitt refer to it. The edition also contains an extremely valuable introductory essay by Tracy B. Strong, Foreword: Dimensions of the New Debate around Carl Schmitt.
18
GOPAL BALAKRISHAN, THE ENEMY: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF CARL SCHMITT (
Verso Sept. 26, 2002). On Schmitt‘s anti-Semitic writings, see STEPHEN HOLMES, THE
ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM 38-39, 50-53 (1993).
19
SCHMITT, supra note 17.
20
ALAN WOLFE, THE FUTURE OF LIBERALISM 126 (2009). Strong‘s introductory essay to
The Concept of the Political, supra note 17, offers an illuminating account of the twists and
turns in the receptions of Schmitt. The connection between Schmitt, Bush Administration
policies, and the lawfare critique was noted as long ago as 2005 by Scott Horton, who developed it in a terrific series of blog posts and articles: Scott Horton, The Return of Carl
Schmitt, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 7, 2005), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/11/
return-of-carl-schmitt.html; Scott Horton, Carl Schmitt and the Military Commissions Act of
2006, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/10/carlschmitt-and-military-commissions_16.html; Scott Horton, Carl Schmitt, the Dolchstoßlegende, and the Law of Armed Conflict, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 21, 2006), available at http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2006/10/carl-schmitt-dolchstolegende-and-law.html; Scott Horton, A
Kinder, Gentler Lawfare, HARPER‘S MAG., Nov. 30, 2007, available at http://www.harpers.
org/archive/2007/11/hbc-90001803; Scott Horton, State of Exception: Bush’s War on the
Rule of Law, HARPER‘S MAG., July 2007, available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/
07/0081595. Schmitt has been adopted by anti-terrorism hawks. See ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 38 (2007) (purporting to ―extract the marrow from Schmitt and throw away the bones‖); cf. Alice Ristroph,
Professors Strangelove (review essay of Posner & Vermeule), 11 GREENBAG 2D 245, 248
(2008) (describing their metaphor as ―probably not the best image with which to invoke a
theorist associated with the Third Reich.‖).
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tinction.21 Furthermore, ―[t]he friend and enemy concepts are to be understood in their concrete and existential sense, not as metaphors or symbols,‖22
and ―[t]he friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning
precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing.‖23
Schmitt does not mean that politics always involves physical warfare: ―War
is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics. But
as an ever present possibility, it is the leading presupposition which determines in a characteristic way human action and thinking and thereby creates
a specifically political behavior.‖24
Schmitt also insists that ―[t]he enemy in the political sense need not
be hated personally‖; but that is irrelevant to whether we will kill him if
necessary.25 We fight not out of personal hatred but because the enemy
threatens our way of life. ―If such physical destruction of human life is not
motivated by an existential threat to one‘s own way of life, then it cannot be
justified. Just as little can war be justified by ethical and juristic norms.‖26
The fallacy of liberalism for Schmitt lies in the thought that man is intrinsically good, so if we eradicate hatred we can eradicate enmity and killing.
On the contrary, ―all genuine political theories presuppose man to be evil,
i.e., by no means an unproblematic but a dangerous and dynamic being.‖27
It follows from Schmitt‘s fundamental friend-enemy conception of
politics that all political groupings are oppositional—no enemies, no politics. The political world is by definition a world of us and them, and a political community ―which embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot
exist.‖28 The ancient ideal of a cosmopolis, a community of all humanity, is
an apolitical fiction, and the fact that one of them, the enemy, is just as human, just as decent, and just as lovable as one of us provides no argument
against killing him.
Of course people will continue to invoke the ideals of ―humanity.‖
But in Schmitt‘s view, anyone who does so operates in bad faith. As he puts
it in the most memorable line in this very memorable book, ―whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat.‖29 Not that there is anything wrong with
cheating—that‘s politics:
That wars are waged in the name of humanity . . . has an especially intensive political meaning. When a state fights its political enemy in the name
of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

SCHMITT, supra note 17, at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54.
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particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent30

Humanitarianism is, in Schmitt‘s view, extraordinarily dangerous. Fighting
on behalf of ―humanity‖ makes your enemy ―an outlaw of humanity‖ and
allows you to do the most terrible things to him.31 A war to end all war—
‖the absolute last war of humanity‖—is ―necessarily unusually intense and
inhuman because . . . it simultaneously degrades the enemy into ...a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed.‖32
And the word ―humanity‖ is not the only polemical, political term
masquerading as a lofty moral concept. ―There are always concrete human
groupings which fight other concrete human groupings in the name of justice, humanity, order, or peace. When being reproached for immorality and
cynicism, the spectator of political phenomena can always recognize in such
reproaches a political weapon used in actual combat.‖33
―The political‖ is not a philosophical idea or indeed an idea of any
sort: it is a concrete, existential reality. Political concepts have only polemical meanings. They may sound philosophical or universal, but in truth
―[t]hey are focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a concrete situation; . . . and they turn into empty and ghostlike abstractions when this situation disappears.‖34 Strictly speaking, then, Schmitt denies the very possibility of political philosophy. There are only political jabs and thrusts disguised
as philosophy.
For Schmitt, indeed, the category of the political devours all other
categories, not merely political philosophy. There is no escaping politics
into a disinterested realm of any sort.
Above all the polemical character determines the use of the word political
regardless of whether the adversary is designated as nonpolitical (in the
sense of harmless), or vice versa if one wants to disqualify or denounce
him as political in order to portray oneself as nonpolitical (in the sense of
purely scientific, purely moral, purely juristic, purely aesthetic, purely
economic, or on the basis of similar purities) and thereby superior.35

We can understand Schmitt‘s point through a contemporary example: debates over climate change or the theory of evolution. Some people think that
whether man-made greenhouse gasses cause dangerous climate change is a
scientific question; so is the question of whether human beings evolved
30

Id.
Id.
32
Id. at 36.
33
Id. at 67.
34
Id. at 30.
35
Id. at 31–32. That includes the purely religious, as Schmitt makes clear. Id. at 39. God
may be above politics but faith in God is not.
31
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from nonhuman ancestors. But those who think that on scientific issues we
should defer to science fail to understand that the concept of the political
devours science along with everything else. If scientific conclusions would
imply that we must change our way of life, we will reject the conclusions
and, if necessary, destroy the scientists. If the scientists complain that attacks on their character, integrity, or honesty are ―political,‖ we will (for
political reasons) denounce their response as merely political.
That is what Schmitt means by saying that ―the polemical character
determines the use of the word political.‖ Even the word political is political: we use it to smear and undermine the claims of our adversaries. ―Terminological questions become . . . highly political.‖36 Then, after denouncing the scientists‘ defense of themselves as political, we will continue to
slime them, and try as hard as we can to get them fired, defunded, and silenced. They may have thought they were answering a scientific, technical
question. But in the world of politics there are no technical questions, only
political questions. Hobbes recognized this when he wrote:
I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, That the three Angles of
a Triangle, should be equall to two Angles of a Square; that doctrine
should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry, suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able.37

Of course Schmitt does not deny that that science, or art, or law, or geometry can be apolitical, provided political bodies find them harmless to their
way of life; even more so if they find them useful in political conflicts.
There is no denying that a state can sometimes gain political advantage by
promoting a flourishing cultural scene. But politics remains primary in the
sense that it is up to political actors to decide when an artist or scientist becomes politically dangerous; if they do, there will be no such thing as art for
art‘s sake or science for the sake of knowledge. The scientists‘ protests of
apolitical innocence will be condemned as an especially crafty political
ruse.
Notice that in the paragraph quoted above Schmitt includes the
―purely juristic‖ as one of the polemical stances enemies can take when they
pretend to be nonpolitical—as a way to be political. The ICRC claims it is
making impartial, ―purely juristic‖ arguments about the laws of war.38 Lawfare critics recognize that ICRC‘s claim to be purely juristic and nonpoliti36

Id. at 31.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 74, Ch. XI (Richard Tuck ed.).
38
See generally, David G. Chandler, The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the
Human Rights NGOs Shaped A New Humanitarian Agenda, HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY,
available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/human_rights_quarterly/v023/23.3chandler.html#
REF3 (describing the ICRC as being nonpolitical).
37
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cal is simply an insidious way of being political, of waging lawfare against
states with powerful armies. The ICRC pretends to be neutral—one of the
tell-tale signs by which we recognize the enemy. In one of most significant
sentences in his book, Schmitt writes: ―The high points of politics are simultaneously the moments in which the enemy is, in concrete reality, recognized as the enemy.‖39 The lawfare critique is, in Schmitt‘s sense, a high
point of politics.
Schmitt denounces all ―neutralizations and depoliticizations,‖40
which for him are the hallmarks of liberalism. There are no neutralizations:
if you are not with us you are against us and we will destroy you: ―If a part
of the population declares that it no longer recognizes enemies, then, depending on the circumstance, it joins their side and aids them.‖41 You may
not be interested in politics, but politics is interested in you.
Is there any escape from the all-consuming quicksand of politics?
Not according to Schmitt: ―If a people no longer possesses the energy or the
will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby
vanish from the world. Only a weak people will disappear.‖42 To retreat
from politics invites annihilation; to yearn for a respite from politics is to
yearn for death.
One additional idea, not very apparent in The Concept of the Political, comes out in some of Schmitt‘s later works, particularly his 1962 lectures on what we would today call terrorism, The Theory of the Partisan:
Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political, and his 1950
book on international law, The Nomos of the Earth. It would be a mistake to
think that Schmitt rejects the idea of laws governing warfare, or, for that
matter, that he idealizes war and rejects humanitarian restraint. Rather, he
believes that the ability to ―bracket‖ war—to limit it according to the jus in
bello principles of non-combatant immunity and avoidance of unnecessary
suffering—is a historically contingent achievement of European public law,
restricted to sovereigns who treat war as akin to a duel among gentlemen.
The jus publicum Europaeanum collapsed through the rise of America, the
advent of air-power that detaches warfare from territory, and non-state warriors who ruthlessly wage absolute war. With it collapsed the possibility of
―bracketed‖ warfare.
At this point, all the pieces of the argument are in place. A world
divided into friends and enemies locked in existential struggle with real,
non-metaphorical killing as the permanent backdrop. A critique of ―humanitarianism‖ as a political ruse. A contempt of liberals for their weakness and
their failure to recognize death struggle as man‘s fate. A thoroughgoing
39
40
41
42

SCHMITT, supra note 17, at 67.
See id. at 69, 80, and 89.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 53.
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skepticism about neutral, apolitical arguments of any sort, including legal
arguments. An insistence that even those who think they can transcend politics into a more neutral, objective realm of science, law, economics, or philosophy are aiding the enemy and can be treated as enemies. An insistence
that laws of armed conflict, particularly laws protecting non-combatants,
depend on reciprocity among states belonging to the classical order of European public law, and that war against terrorists can never be bracketed.
III. SCHMITT, STRAUSS, AND THE QUESTION OF INFLUENCE
Did Carl Schmitt actually exert any influence on contemporary lawfare critics? I do not know the answer—you would have to ask them. On its
face, the proposition seems unlikely: Schmitt was barely discussed outside
academic circles, or even much discussed within academic circles, until the
middle of the millennial decade. The current edition of The Concept of the
Political appeared in 2007; his influential Political Theology was out of
print in English for a decade before its 2006 reprint; and the English translations of most of Schmitt‘s other books appeared after 2005.43 A Lexis
search reveals five law review references to Schmitt between 1980 and
1990; 114 between 1990 and 2000; and 420 since 2000, with almost twice
as many in the last five years as the previous five.
One possible connection, noted in 2005 by Scott Horton, is through
Leo Strauss.44 Strauss‘s youthful essay on The Concept of the Political is
included in the book‘s English translation.45 Strauss applauded Schmitt‘s
critique of liberalism enthusiastically, and his only criticisms of Schmitt
were that Schmitt masked the extent of his nausea (Strauss‘s word) over
pacifism and liberalism, and refrained from following his own argument to
the inevitable conclusion that humanitarian ideals are not merely unrealistic,
but are actually immoral and must be combated.46 Strauss‘s essay demanded
a less kind, less gentle Schmitt—one might say that Strauss‘s essay is
Schmitt without a humanitarian face. Strauss, unlike Schmitt, has exerted a
powerful and lasting influence on American politics, in no small part because so many Straussians have occupied positions in government, journalism, and the neoconservative movement.47 Neoconservatives have been
among the most vigorous lawfare critics.
43

See ELLEN KENNEDY, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE: CARL SCHMITT IN WEIMAR 2 (Duke
Univ. Press 2004); Craig McFarlane, Carl Schmitt in English, THEORIA, http://www.theoria.
ca/research/ (updated Nov. 1, 2008).
44
See Horton, The Return of Carl Schmitt, supra note 20.
45
SCHMITT, supra note 17, at 97.
46
See id. at 116 (―nausea‖), 119–20 (discussing Schmitt‘s concealment of his moral critique of humanitarian ideals).
47
See, e.g., CATHERINE H. ZUCKERT & MICHAEL ZUCKERT, THE TRUTH ABOUT LEO
STRAUSS: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (The Chicago Univ. Press
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But I am not arguing for a causal influence of Schmitt on lawfare
critics, because I cannot demonstrate that it is there. Rather, I am arguing
that Schmitt‘s philosophy offers the best articulation I have found of the
lawfare critique. It may be time for lawfare critics to take ownership of their
ancestor.
IV. SCHMITT‘S MISREPRESENTATION OF POLITICS
What can be said in response to Schmitt?48 A full-fledged assessment of Schmitt‘s views lies beyond my aim in this short paper. But I would
like to raise some points that bear specifically on the lawfare debate.
Start with Schmitt‘s insistence that the term ―political‖ is itself polemical.49 This amounts to a hidden, self-referential caution to readers that
Schmitt‘s own concept of the political is polemical. It is not neutral, objective, academic, or philosophical. It is slanted, biased, and loaded. Schmitt
tells us that much, but he never holds the mirror to himself and tell us exactly how his concept is loaded.
My answer is that even though ―that‘s just political!‖ is often an accusation, the word ―political‖ has positive associations in our tradition,
which Schmitt cunningly trades on. Aristotle proclaimed that man is the
zoôn politikon, the political animal, and argued that the political life is the
best and freest life for man as a practical being.50 It would seem to follow,
then, that pacifists or humanitarians who yearn for the end of bloody friendenemy polarities want to destroy something essential to human beings. At
several points in The Concept of the Political, duly noted by Strauss,
Schmitt hints, without actually saying, that even if it were possible to expunge deadly friend-enemy dyads from the world it would not be desirable.
It would shrink the meaningfulness of human life to mere entertainment; life
would at most be interesting, but never meaningful.51 Strauss seizes on these
hints that a depoliticized world would be a sub-human world and insists that
this is Schmitt‘s actual view.52
We hear in Strauss echoes of Nietzsche‘s contempt for ―the last
man,‖ the post-dangerous man, the timid bourgeois—about whom Schmitt
2006); SHADIA B. DRURY, LEO STRAUSS AND THE AMERICAN RIGHT (St. Martin‘s Press 1999);
ANNE NORTON, LEO STRAUSS AND THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (Yale Univ. Press
(2004) (discussing Strauss‘s influence).
48
Other than noting his disagreeable career as a Nazi and anti-Semite. See Strong, supra
note 17, at ix-x; HOLMES, supra note 18, at 38-39; BALAKRISHAN, supra note 18.
49
See SCHMITT, supra note 17, at 31-33.
50
Aristotle, Politics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 1987,
1.2.1253a2. Aristotle claims at the beginning of the Politics that the state (the polis) ―aims at
good in a greater degree than any other [community], and at the highest good.‖ Id. at 1986,
1.1.1252a5-63.
51
SCHMITT, supra note 17, at 35; Strauss, supra note 17, at 53.
52
Strauss, supra note 17, at 115–17.
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too speaks with contempt.53 Without politics, man would not be man. He
would be a tamed puppy. Schmitt does not quite say this, but he hints at it:
―Were this entity [the friend-enemy grouping] to disappear, . . . then the
political itself would disappear.‖54 That sounds pretty scary if you have positive Aristotelian associations with politics, but in fact, Schmitt‘s assertion
is a mere tautology. He has defined the concept of the political as the friendenemy grouping, so by definition if the friend-enemy grouping disappears
the political disappears. So what? The only thing that makes this assertion
sound significant is the set of associations—absent from Schmitt‘s friendenemy construct—that makes us think the political is a form of community
rather than antipathy, and therefore that the political is indispensible to
meaningful human life.
Among these associations is the positive, constructive side of politics, the very foundation of Aristotle‘s conception of politics, which Schmitt
completely ignores. Politics, we often say, is the art of the possible. It is the
medium for organizing all human cooperation. Peaceable civilization, civil
institutions, and elemental tasks such as collecting the garbage and delivering food to hungry mouths all depend on politics. Of course, peering into
the sausage factory of even such mundane municipal institutions as the town
mayor‘s office will reveal plenty of nasty politicking, jockeying for position
and patronage, and downright corruption. Schmitt sneers at these as ―banal
forms of politics, . . . all sorts of tactics and practices, competitions and intrigues‖ and dismisses them contemptuously as ―parasite- and caricaturelike formations.‖55 The fact is that Schmitt has nothing whatever to say
about the constructive side of politics, and his entire theory focuses on enemies, not friends. In my small community, political meetings debate issues
as trivial as whether to close a street and divert the traffic to another street.
It is hard to see mortal combat as even a remote possibility in such disputes,
and so, in Schmitt‘s view, they would not count as politics, but merely administration. Yet issues like these are the stuff of peaceable human politics.
Schmitt, I have said, uses the word ―political‖ polemically—in his
sense, politically. I have suggested that his very choice of the word ―political‖ to describe mortal enmity is tendentious, attaching to mortal enmity
Aristotelian and republican associations quite foreign to it. But the more
basic point is that Schmitt‘s critique of humanitarianism as political and
polemical is itself political and polemical. In a word, the critique of lawfare
is itself lawfare. It is self-undermining because to the extent that it succeeds
in showing that lawfare is illegitimate, it de-legitimizes itself.
What about the merits of Schmitt‘s critique of humanitarianism?
His argument is straightforward: either humanitarianism is toothless and
53
54
55

Id. at 51 and 62.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 30.
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apolitical, in which case ruthless political actors will destroy the humanitarians; or else humanitarianism is a fighting faith, in which case it has succumbed to the political but made matters worse, because wars on behalf of
humanity are the most inhuman wars of all. Liberal humanitarianism is
either too weak or too savage.
The argument has obvious merit. When Schmitt wrote in 1932 that
wars against ―outlaws of humanity‖ would be the most horrible of all, it is
hard not to salute him as a prophet of Hiroshima. The same is true when
Schmitt writes about the League of Nations‘ resolution to use ―economic
sanctions and severance of the food supply,‖56 which he calls ―imperialism
based on pure economic power.‖57 Schmitt is no warmonger—he calls the
killing of human beings for any reason other than warding off an existential
threat ―sinister and crazy‖58—nor is he indifferent to human suffering.
But international humanitarian law and criminal law are not the
same thing as wars to end all war or humanitarian military interventions, so
Schmitt‘s important moral warning against ultimate military selfrighteousness does not really apply.59 Nor does ―bracketing‖ war by humanitarian constraints on war-fighting presuppose a vanished order of European public law. The fact is that in nine years of conventional war, the United States has significantly bracketed war-fighting, even against enemies
who do not recognize duties of reciprocity.60 This may frustrate current lawfare critics who complain that American soldiers in Afghanistan are being
forced to put down their guns. Bracketing warfare is a decision—Schmitt
might call it an existential decision—that rests in part on values that transcend the friend-enemy distinction. Liberal values are not alien extrusions
into politics or evasions of politics; they are part of politics, and, as Stephen
Holmes argued against Schmitt, liberalism has proven remarkably strong,
not weak.61 We could choose to abandon liberal humanitarianism, and that
would be a political decision. It would simply be a bad one.

56

Id. at 79.
Id. at 78.
58
Id. at 48.
59
David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT‘L L. 85 (2004).
60
See generally, MARK OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009)
(arguing that there are reasons beyond reciprocity for maintaining humanitarian norms).
61
HOLMES, supra note 18, at 57-58. Holmes reminds us rather dryly that it was the liberal
states that won World War I. Id. at 48.
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